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Reen

Crime Prevention Security
Not Required ForATMs
In Popp v. Cash Station, Inc., No.
1-90-0321,1992 WL 356851 (Ill. App.
Dec. 4, 1992), the Illinois Appellate
Court held that the company operating
automated teller machines in the Chicago area had no duty to provide its
customers with security protection from
criminal attacks. The court further
held that the company's marketing of
cash access cards without disclosing its
lack of machine security violated neither the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act
nor the Illinois Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act.
Cash at Your Own Risk
Cash Station, Inc. ("Cash Station")
operates a nationwide network of automated teller machines ("ATMs") in
conjunction with member banks.
Through the ATMs, account holders of
member banks can withdraw cash from
their accounts. Cash Station maintains
twenty-four hour a day availability for
the ATMs, most of which are not safeguarded with crime prevention devices
such as cameras or silent alarms. Furthermore, Cash Station does not generally restrict access to the ATMs to only
those possessing valid ATM cards.
Numerous ATM customers have reported criminal attacks both in Chicago
and nationwide.
Several years ago, Cash Station
merged with Money Network, another
supplier of ATM services. The merger
created a virtual monopoly for Cash
Station with regard to ATM services in
the Chicago area.
Cecilia E. Popp ("Popp"), a Cash
Station cardholder, filed suit against
Cash Station. Popp alleged that she and
other cardholders suffered damages
from the exposure to risk of criminal
attack while using the ATMs. Popp
also contended that Cash Station violated Illinois antitrust laws since the
merger with Money Network essenVolume 5 Number 3/Spring 1993
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tially prevented ATM users from obtaining cash access services from other
providers, who would furnish security.
Popp sought to enjoin Cash Station
from operating ATMs without security
systems. In the alternative, Popp requested a mandatory injunction requiring the Cash Station to implement security systems and to notify customers
of the ATMs' current safety measures.
The trial court dismissed Popp's
complaint. The court found that Popp
failed to allege any facts proving that
Cash Station had a duty for the safety of
the ATM customers. Additionally, the
court stated that Popp failed to present
any facts indicating that Cash Station
had a similar duty to notify customers
about ATM security. Popp appealed
the decision to the Illinois Appellate
Court.
No Foreseeability,No Duty
Popp first argued that Cash Station
maintained an affirmative duty to implement reasonable measures for the protection of its ATM customers. Popp
asserted that the duty stemmed from
Cash Station's knowledge of previous,
and the foreseeability of future, attacks
at the ATMs. The court, however,
rejected this contention.
The court stated that landowners
generally have no duty to protect others
from criminal attacks on their property. Only special relationships between the parties, such as a business
relation, create such a duty. The court
also noted that reasonable foreseeability
of harm is the primary factor in determining whether a duty exists.
The court concluded that Popp failed
to sufficiently show that Cash Station
could foresee future attacks at the ATMs.
More specifically, the court stated that
Popp's reliance on statistics, rather than
on specific allegations of where and
when future crimes might occur, failed
to prove foreseeability. Consequently, without the element of
foreseeability, the court ruled that
Cash Station did not assume a duty

to protect cardholders from attacks.
Additionally, the court held that
Popp's status as an invitee on Cash
Station's property did not create a duty.
The court stated that in determining the
duty owed to an invitee, both the
landowner's knowledge and the
invitee's lack of knowledge of the danger regarding the premises are relevant
factors. The court found that since
Cash Station had no unique knowledge
of any future attack at ATMs, the risk
involved was "speculative and remote."
Furthermore, the court stated that
Popp's complaint, which demonstrated
her awareness of the possible attacks
and risks'of ATMs, negated any possible duty Cash Station might owe her.
Court Finds No Consumer Fraud
The court also rejected Popp' s claim
under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act.
The court stated that Popp failed to
allege that Cash Station either misrepresented its security or concealed knowledge of specific dangers unknown to
consumers.
Similarly, the court found that Cash
Station had not violated the Illinois
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(the "Act"). It stated that an action
under the Act could be sustained only if
Popp alleged facts that indicated
cardholders were "likely to be damaged" in the future. The court found
Popp's statement that Cash Station's
conduct created "a likelihood of confusion" merely conclusory because she
failed to state facts regarding how Cash
Station failed to provide security systems or to disclose that the risks involved may have contributed to the
confusion. Furthermore, the court
emphasized that Popp's knowledge of
the security risks and of Cash Station's
alleged non-disclosure precluded any
possibility of confusion.
Breach of Implied Warranty
Argument Also Rejected
The court similarly affirmed the
lower court's dismissal of Popp's
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breach of implied warranty claim. It
noted that under Illinois law, failure to
attach a copy of the contract from
which the warranty arises, or an affidavit stating that a copy is unobtainable,
warrants dismissal of the argument.
Thus, the court concluded that although
a written contract between the parties
could have formed the basis of a warranty, Popp's failure to attach the appropriate documents justified dismissal
of this claim.

(5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that under Texas law,
corporate officers are individually liable for their own deceptive and fraudulent representations, even if they acted
within the scope of corporate authority. Furthermore, the court held that
the Texas Deceptive Trade PracticeConsumer Protection Act, Tex. Bus. &
Comm. Code Ann. sec. 17.41 et seq.
(Vernon 1987), applies to loans if used
to purchase specific items.

Court Finds No Antitrust Violation
The court also rejected Popp's claim
that Cash Station's merger with Money
Network violated the Illinois antitrust
laws. The court emphasized that a
monopoly is not per se illegal and that
only the use of anti-competitive means
to achieve or maintain a monopoly
violates the antitrust laws. Thus, Popp
could recover only if she established
that Cash Station engaged in some type
of prohibited anti-competitive conduct,
which consequently caused economic
injury. The court found that Popp
failed to allege that Cash Station possessed monopoly power to control prices
or to exclude competition. Instead,
Popp only alleged that, but for the
merger, there would be competition
between providers of ATM services
which could induce one or more competitors to provide ATM security systems. The court concluded that Popp's
complaint lacked specific facts required
for a claim under the Illinois antitrust
laws. Furthermore, the court stated
that since Popp's fear of criminal attack was not an economic injury, an
antitrust claim is inapplicable. o*

The Quid Pro Quo
In October 1982, real estate developers Ted Walker and James Brunson
(the "Developers") contacted defendant Ron Bearden, a Mainland Savings
Association ("Mainland") officer and
director. The Developers offered to
sell the International Energy Center
building (the "IEC Building") to Mainland. Months of negotiations ensued,
during which the parties discussed a
$21 million project development loan
to the Developers. The Developers
contended that Mainland offered the
loan, along with $1 million, in exchange
for the IEC Building. However, the
parties never executed a written loan
agreement.
On August 8, 1983, the Developers
exchanged the IEC Building and surrounding property with Mainland for
$1 million in cash and the alleged $21
million loan. Mainland's attorney,
drafted the exchange agreement.
Mainland, however, never issued
the loan to the Developers. Consequently, they sued Mainland and two of
its directors, Bearden and Hill, in Texas
state court, claiming that Mainland
failed to provide a $21 million dollar
loan in return for the sale of the IEC
Building.
A legal morass ensued involving
two connected suits and Mainland's
insolvency. Mainland's insolvency
brought in federal agencies as parties
and the consolidated suits went back
and forth between state and federal
court. At the point of this appeal, the
only remaining defendants were
Bearden and Hill as individuals. A
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Texas Law Permits Fraud
ClaimsAgainst Corporate
Agents as Individuals
In Walker v. F.D.LC., 970 F.2d 114

Texas state court had entered a judgment in favor of Bearden and Hill
stating that they could not be personally liable for the alleged acts unless
they performed or made fraudulent
representations outside the scope of
their employment. The Developers
appealed, and a federal district court
affirmed the decision. The Developers
appealed a second time.
Agents May be PersonallyLiable
On appeal, the developers contended
that Bearden and Hill reneged on their
promise of a $21 million loan. The
Developers charged that Bearden and
Hill were liable for fraud, conspiracy,
and on an estoppel theory. Additionally, the Developers claimed that
Bearden and Hill violated the Deceptive Trade Practice-Consumer Protection Act (the "Act"). In response,
Bearden and Hill asserted that corporate agents cannot be personally liable
for acts committed within the scope of
employment, and therefore, the court
should dismiss the suit.
The Fifth Circuit rejected Bearden
and Hill's argument. Instead, it found
that under Texas law, corporate officers could be held individually liable for
deception and fraud, even if it is committed within the scope of their corporate authority. The court based its
decision on a Texas Supreme Court
ruling, which held that under the Act,
a corporate agent may be held personally liable for oral or written promises
made by them, even if made within the
scope of employment. The appellate
court reversed, and a jury is set to
decide this claim at trial.
FraudClaimAgainst Bearden
Reversed
The appellate court next addressed
the claim of fraud against Bearden. It
stated that, although Bearden submitted evidence that he did not make
material misrepresentations, the Developers rebutted this evidence with
sufficient proof to create an issue of
material fact as to fraud. Consequently,
the court held that there was sufficient
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

